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ABSTRACT 
One of the pioneers in academic entrepreneurship and high-tech clustering is 
MIT and the Route 128/Boston region. Silicon Valley centered around 
Stanford University was originally a fast follower and only later emerged as 
a scientific and industrial hotspot. Several technology and innovation waves, 
have shaped Silicon Valley over all the years. The initial regional success of 
Silicon Valley started with electro-technical instruments and defense 
applications in the 1940s and 1950s (represented by companies as Litton 
Engineering and Hewlett & Packard). In the 1960s and 1970s, the region 
became a national and international leader in the design and production of 
integrated circuit and computer chips, and as such became identified as 
Silicon Valley (e.g. Fairchild Semiconductor, and Intel). In the 1970s and 
1980s, Silicon Valley capitalised further on the development, manufacturing 
and sales of the personal computer and workstations (e.g. Apple, Silicon 
Graphics and SUN), followed by the proliferation of telecommunications 
and Internet technologies in the 1990s (e.g. Cisco, 3Com) and Internet-based 
applications and info-mediation services (e.g. Yahoo, Google) in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. When the external and/or internal conditions of its 
key industries change, Silicon Valley seemed to have an innate capability to 
restructure itself by a rapid and frequent reshuffling of people, competencies, 
resources and firms. To characterise the demise of one firm leading, directly 
or indirectly, to the formation of another and the reconfiguration of business 
models and product offerings by the larger companies in emerging 
industries, Bahrami & Evans (2000) introduced the term `flexible recycling.’ 
This dynamic process of learning by doing, failing and recombining (i.e. 
allowing new firms to rise from the ashes of failed enterprises) is one of the 
key factors underlying the dominance of Silicon Valley in the new economy. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the beginning, there was a garage in northern California. And the garage 
– plus two nerds – begat the personal computer. And it was good. In fact, it 
was a best thing, the first best thing. And the two nerds became rich and 
multiplied. And the first best thing begat a faster slicker machine – the next 
best thing – and it begat the next and the next and so on and on until, one 
day, the best things begat Silicon Valley (Dillon 1996: dust-jacket). 
 
Silicon Valley is the ideal version of a dynamic techno-industrial region and as such 
it has been widely emulated, both within and outside the US (Rosenberg 2002; 
Bresnahan & Gambardella 2004). Another remarkable achievement is the ease and 
speed with which Silicon Valley manages to adapt to changing circumstances. 
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Originally Santa Clara Valley was a rural area with small-scale horticulture (i.e. the 
growing of all kind of fruits and vegetables); now this valley has been transformed 
into a high-tech region, characterised by extensive technology and office parks, 
urban areas, large-scale shopping centres, connected by a close-knit network of 
highways. Some authors go even further and interpret the making of the booming 
hotspot in North California as a 20th version of the Renaissance (Winslow 1995). A 
key role in developing these high technologies in the Valley was played by Stanford 
University, continuously seeking to commercialise new knowledge and innovations 
through contract research and promoting start-up and spin-off companies. Silicon 
Valley has become a magnet attracting talent from all over the world with open and 
flexible labour markets characterized by task rotation, horizontal mobility, and 
information for a continuous fermentation of new ideas and stimulating new techno-
industrial and organizational challenges (Hyde 2003). Furthermore, entrepreneurial 
engineers and managers leave their established companies to start for themselves (in 
the 1960s), leading technology firms have established themselves in this dynamic 
cluster in order to draw from an emerging concentration of talented people (in the 
1960s and 1970s), and also venture capital firms established themselves in the heart 
of Silicon Valley that was to become a hot spot for talent, creativity, innovativeness 
and high-impact venturing. 
 
The rural Santa Clara Valley has become the techno-industrial hotspot Silicon 
Valley, where initially the focus was on the design and production of 
semiconductors (in the 1960s and 1970s), and later on the manufacturing of personal 
computers, network technologies and workstations (in the 1980s and 1990s), and 
eventually moving towards all kind of Internet applications and multimedia (late 
1990s till today). Silicon Valley, or more appropriately the Bay Area, is also one of 
the leading global centres of expertise in the field of biotechnology (Zhang & Patel 
2005). This dominance started with the first demonstration of gene cloning and 
splicing (recombinant DNA) in the early 1970s by Stanley Cohen of the Stanford 
Medical School and Herbert Boyer of the University of California San Francisco. 
The subsequent patents on gene cloning and gene splicing made that the two North-
Californian universities big earners of royalties and turned Genentech, set up by the 
scientist Boyer and the venture capitalist Robert Swanson of Kleiner & Perkins in 
1976/77 and located in the Southern parts of San Francisco, into a successful and 
major developer of human protein and human insulin. Other leading Silicon Valley 
and Bay Area companies that were among the pioneers of the biotechnology 
industry are Cetus-Chiron, Affymetrix, and Gilead Sciences. 
 
Long before the rise of Silicon Valley, Route 128 around Boston in Massachusetts 
played a pioneering role in the clustering of information and communication 
technology companies. Massachusetts is among the leading technology states, in 
terms of patents per capita, invention disclosures, technology licenses issued, 
venture capital and the number of initial public offerings; diversified employment 
and diverse industrial base (Lampe, 1988: Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992). Furthermore, 
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the Boston area has among the highest concentration of colleges and universities, 
research institutes and hospitals in the world. In addition to Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) and Harvard University, the region has other important 
universities, such as Northeastern, Babson College, Boston University, Brandeis, 
University of Massachusetts, and Tufts University. In the domain of science and 
technology development and biomedical research, the Boston region has 
internationally renowned R&D laboratories at its disposal, such as Draper, Lincoln, 
Mitre Corporation, the Whitehead Institute, and the Dana-Farber Institute, and the 
leading combined teaching and research hospitals Brigham and Women’s Hospital 
and Massachusetts General Hospital (both affiliated with Harvard Medical School). 
With such a deep and diverse knowledge base it is not without surprise that the 
Route 128 region is also leading in the field of biotechnology, both in technology 
and market development with flagship firms such as Seragen, Repligen, Biogen, 
Genzyme, and Cambridge Bio having the greater Boston area as their home base. As 
such, MIT and Harvard University, together with their spin-off firms and R&D 
affiliations were among the global pioneers in modern academic entrepreneurship 
and high-technology cluster development (Etzkowitz, 2002; Cruikshank, 2005). In 
the first half of the 20th century, MIT served as a model for Stanford University and 
other research universities with regard to working together with companies in the 
area of education and research, among other things through apprenticeships, 
business consultancy, contract research, spin-off creation and the use of venture 
capital. The MIT/Route 128 cluster has always depended heavily on the defense 
policy of the American government. In 1962, for instance, government purchases 
made up about half of the turnover of the local businesses in the region. MIT, and its 
specialised research laboratories (like the Draper & Lincoln Labs), has been part of 
the military-industrial complex. The big defence and aerospace contracts were 
awarded to MIT-related firms like DEC, Raytheon, Data General, Prime and EG&G. 
 
Although MIT originally served as a role model for Stanford, in recent decades the 
situation has been reversed: Stanford University was among the first in the world to 
establish an independent contract research organisation (Stanford Research Institute 
in 1946, later renamed as SRI) and a science and technology park (Stanford 
Industrial Park in 1951, later renamed as Stanford Research park). In the 1950s and 
1960s, economic gravity shifted to the West Coast and due to the catch-up efforts of 
Stanford University, supported by the University of California Berkeley, and the 
techno-industrial achievements of its affiliated companies and institutions (e.g. HP, 
Intel, XEROX, SRI), Silicon Valley had the cutting edge from the 1970s onwards. 
This chapter starts with shedding a light on the pioneer in academic entrepreneurship 
and high-tech clustering, namely MIT and the Route 128/Boston region. Then the 
attention shifts to the fast follower Silicon Valley and its emergence as a scientific 
and industrial hotspot. Several technology and innovation waves, have shaped 
Silicon Valley over all the years; the dominant ones are identified below and will be  
discussed subsequently (see figure 1): 
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 - the initial regional success of Silicon Valley started with electro-technical 
instruments and defense applications in the 1940s and 1950s (represented by 
companies as Litton Engineering and Hewlett & Packard); 
- in the 1960s and 1970s, the region became a national and international leader in the 
design and production of integrated circuit and computer chips, and as such became 
identified as Silicon Valley (e.g. Fairchild Semiconductor, and Intel); 
- in the 1970s and 1980s, Silicon Valley capitalised further on the development, 
manufacturing and sales of the personal computer and workstations (e.g. Apple, 
Silicon Graphics and SUN); 
- and followed by the proliferation of telecommunications and Internet technologies 
in the 1990s (e.g. Cisco, 3Com) and Internet-based applications and info-mediation 
services (e.g. Yahoo, Google) in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
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Figure 1: The growth of Silicon Valley (1950-2000) (based on Joint Venture 2001) 
 
When the external and/or internal conditions of its key industries change, Silicon 
Valley seemed to have an innate capability to restructure itself by a rapid and 
frequent reshuffling of people, competencies, resources and firms. To characterise 
the demise of one firm leading, directly or indirectly, to the formation of another and 
the reconfiguration of business models and product offerings by the larger 
companies in emerging industries, Bahrami & Evans (2000) introduced the term 
`flexible recycling. This dynamic process of learning by doing, failing and 
recombining (i.e. allowing new firms to rise from the ashes of failed enterprises) is 
one of the key factors underlying the dominance of Silicon Valley in the new 
economy. A key concept in the emergence and evolution of new industries, like 
semiconductors and computing, is the notion of ‘genealogy maps’ providing 
relational information on founders of companies and the previous company 
affiliation of the founders. Especially, in an environment with a high degree of 
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techno-industrial dynamics, volatility and entrepreneurialism, we can chart a 
genealogy of spin-off firms from source organisations, like universities and 
corporate laboratories, created by entrepreneurial engineers and managers setting up 
their own shop and established organizations spawning out project teams and 
established as independent entities. Examples of spin-off formation, repeat (or 
serial) entrepreneurship and corporate divestitures are given in this chapter through 
the genealogy charts of the spin-off firms of MIT and Stanford, and the leading 
Silicon Valley R&D laboratory of XEROX PARC and the pioneering 
semiconductor company Fairchild. 
THE PIONEER: MIT’S ROUTE 128 IN GREATER BOSTON (NEW ENGLAND) 
Route 128 refers to the region along the Yankee Division Highway (Route 128, 
Interstate 95), some 14 miles of highway to the west of Boston, Massachusetts. 
Boston has an age-old industrial tradition: first textile, guns and machine tools, after 
that automobiles and electrotechnical instruments, and then (mini)computers and 
information systems. The region’s core institute is the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), which was established in 1861. MIT was founded with 
assistance from a 30% share of the state of Massachusetts land grant policy (under 
the Morill Act federal lands were provided to each state to support the development 
of institutions of higher education for the benefit of agriculture, mining, and 
manufacturing). MIT played a pioneering role in stimulating ‘academic’ 
entrepreneurship and technology transfer (Etzkowitz, 2002). For instance, scientists 
and doctoral students were encouraged by the MIT-directors to exploit the research 
results commercially, do regular (part-time) consultancy activities and to set up their 
own companies. Early spin-offs of MIT were the consulting and engineering firm of 
Stone Webster and Arthur D. Little at the end of the 19th century. In the early 20th 
century, MIT gave birth to, for instance, Raytheon (founded in 1922 as the 
American Appliance Company by the then MIT professor Vannevar Bush), EG&G 
(founded in 1933 by MIT professor Harold Edgerton and his associates 
Germeshausen and Grier) and Polaroid (founded in 1937 by former MIT researcher 
Edwin Land).  
 
As an institution, MIT placed great value on the social and/or industrial commitment 
of education and research, and on carrying out contract research for (local) 
businesses. MIT always kept close links with industry, especially with large 
companies like General Electric, Eastman Kodak and Dupont. To this end, a special 
Technology Plan was developed in 1918, in which industrial sponsors contributed 
ideas and resources for fundamental and applied research. In the 1920’s, a special 
Division of Industrial Cooperation and Research was set up to maintain research 
contacts and to acquire and carry out contract research for companies. Later, the 
Technology Plan was integrated into the Contract Research Division, which in turn 
saw its name changed to the Office of Sponsored Projects. After the industrial slump 
in the 1930’s, large-scale government investments in new military technology and 
defence industry during the Second World War led to a revival of the New England 
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and Massachusetts economy. In that period MIT became the country’s leading 
research centre. MIT laboratories received $ 330 million, one third of all the 
assignments of the Federal Office for Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), 
possibly in part thanks to its director Vannevar Bush, former professor and Vice 
President of MIT and co-founder of military equipment supplier Raytheon. The 
local industry also benefited. Thanks to military orders during the Second World 
War, Raytheon’s turnover grew from $ 3 million to $ 173 million. The so-called 
Research Row, with the laboratories of MIT, Harvard University and industrial 
laboratories located to each other almost within walking distance, formed an 
unparalleled intellectual and technological labour pool at the end of the Second 
World War.  
 
Karl Taylor Compton, MIT’s President between 1930 and 1948, ensured that the 
(potential) academic entrepreneurs of MIT were given easier access to venture 
capital. While Raytheon was founded in the 1920’s with financial support from 
banker J.P. Morgan, local insurance companies and wealthy Bostonians, in 1946 
Compton, together with Harvard colleague General Georges Doriot (Professor 
Industrial Management) and MIT alumni, created the first venture capital fund, i.e. 
American Research and Development (ARD). In the early years of ARD’s existence 
MIT’s influence was still big (via a direct investment in the fund and representation 
of the faculty directors on the Council for Scientific Advice). Later MIT reduced its 
financial and organisational commitments. ARD’s first major investments were in 
High Voltage Engineering, Ionics, Tracerlab and Digital Equipment Corporation. 
Later, various venture capital companies emerged from ARD, the most important 
ones being Boston Capital, Palmer, Charles River Partnership and Morgan-Holland 
(Tödtling 1994).  
 
The success of the industry from the Route 128 region led to a surplus of capital, 
while government contracts kept coming. In the forties and fifties MIT founded a 
number of important research laboratories that are still international leaders. The 
Radiation Laboratory (which was later split up into the Research Laboratory for 
Electronics and the independent Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratory) and the 
Instrumentation Laboratory (which in 1973 became independent and was renamed 
the Charles Stark Draper Lab) played an important role in the development of radar 
and navigation systems. In 1951, the Lincoln Laboratory was founded, among other 
things for the development of high-speed digital data processors for military 
applications. In terms of financing, the Lincoln Lab has always been heavily 
dependent on the defence authorities. One of the spin-offs of the Lincoln Labs was 
the MITRE Corporation, founded in 1958, which had a special responsibility for 
carrying out contract research for the Federal Government and for designing and 
managing defence systems (Hughes 1998).  
 
In the 1950’s, Route 128 was the home base of various leading semiconductor 
manufacturers: e.g. Sylvania, Transitron, RCA and Western Electric. Also the first 
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minicomputer companies were founded, initially for a specific purpose (Ceruzzi 
1998). Wang Laboratories (founded by An Wang as a spin-off of Harvard 
University’s Computer Lab) started in 1951, and initially focused on calculators and 
later on office automation and word processing. Ken Olsen, involved in the Lincoln 
Lab in the deployment of advanced computers in an air defence system (the 
combined SAGE Air defence system and the Whirlwind computer project), in 1957, 
together with partner Harlan Anderson and with financial support from ARD ($ 
70,000), founded Digital Equipment Corporation (Roberts 1991). Within DEC 
Olsen and Anderson were looking for ways to make computers smaller and more 
versatile, and in 1959 this led to the first commercial general-purpose computer: the 
Programmed Data Processor (PDP)-1. In the sixties and seventies dozens of 
minicomputer firms were founded, often as spin-offs of existing companies. The 
successful entrepreneurs served as attractive role models to potential entrepreneurs. 
Well-known examples are Data General as a spin-off of DEC (1968) and Prime 
Computer as a spin-off of Honeywell (1972). The minicomputer industry emerged 
in parallel with the electronic industry and as such could utilise the available job 
shops. In the course of the 1970’s, the quickly developing minicomputer industry 
led to a revival of the regions economy. The big computer manufacturers DEC, Data 
General, Wang, Honeywell and Prime dominated the regional economy and 
controlled at that time two-thirds of the world’s minicomputer market. In 1977, 
DEC’s turnover broke the $ 1 billion barrier, and in 1982 the company was the 
world’s undisputed minicomputer champion with a 42% share (local competitor 
Data General had an 11% share) (Rogers & Larsen 1984: 238).  
 
The dominant industrial system for the production of (mini)computers was to a large 
extent vertically integrated, with independently operating companies taking care of 
all the links in the computer’s value chain. Rather, than outsourcing, companies like 
Data General and DEC manufactured their own internal components (e.g. 
semiconductors, keyboards, disk drives and screens). The technology companies of 
Route 128 have a quasi-hierarchical kind of entrepreneurship with a strong company 
loyalty which, according to Saxenian (1994), they have taken over from earlier 
generations of industrial enterprises. The social relations and dominant culture of 
New England are characterised by a tradition of cautiousness and frugality. Identity 
comes from the family and class to which one belongs. The social environment is 
formed by the ‘extended’ family of church, local schools, clubs, etc. The number of 
informal business and professional contacts between companies is limited. Stability 
and loyalty were valued more than experimenting and taking risks. This autarchic 
business culture, with, for instance, few spin-off companies, was stimulated by the 
ongoing dominance of military technological research and the production of defence 
parts that involved a certain degree of secrecy. Also, the companies opted in favour 
of proprietary products and systems as a way of keeping out the competition, rather 
than looking for fast innovation and dynamics by using open and non-exclusive 
standards. With these exclusive products customers would have to make large 
investments, if they were to switch suppliers. Even the venture capital sector in 
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Boston was conservative, and as such it was dominated by bankers rather than 
(former) entrepreneurs.  
 
In the seventies and eighties, MIT, with the knowledge gathered about computer 
time sharing and man-machine interface in the SAGE and MAC projects of the 
fifties and sixties, together with Harvard University, MIT spin-off Bolt Beranek & 
Newman (BBN) and computer researchers from California (UCLA, Stanford and 
RAND), gave an enormous boost to the creation of what would evolve into the 
Internet (Hafner & Lyon 1996; Hughes 1998). First, the Lincoln Lab, and later the 
Laboratory for Computer Science (LCS), which was founded in 1964, played an 
important role in the invention and further development of the main components of 
the advanced computer system of the Internet, such as, the IMP (Interface Message 
Processor: a router avant la lettre), TCP/IP network protocol and RSA encryption 
technology (Hughes 1998). As with numerous other MIT institutes, the contract 
research that was carried out within LCS has led to a number of commercial spin-
offs, for example: Computek (founded in 1968 by LCS researcher Dertouzos), 
Infocom (co-founded in 1979 by LCS director Licklider), and RSA Data Security 
(founded in 1983 by LCS researchers Rivest, Shamir and Adleman). 
The minicomputer manufacturers of Route 128 quickly lost ground to the 
manufacturers of the fast-emerging PC’s and workstations in Silicon Valley. Fast 
technological developments and dynamic market changes favour an open and 
entrepreneurial culture and industrial system that is based on flexible production 
networks and on encouraging experimentation and open innovation, such as in 
Silicon Valley. In itself the industrial system of Route 128, based as it is on 
vertically integrated companies operating (relatively) independently from each other 
and following a more closed innovation model, does not have to be a problem, as 
long there is no enormous growth and as long as the technological developments can 
be predicted and planned. The speedy and revolutionary developments in network 
and Internet technology, however, demand an open strategy and non-exclusive 
systems, allowing many parties to contribute and to specialise in certain components 
and (sub)products. Something what cannot be found in the Boston, but can be found 
in the Bay Area, although MIT remains to play an important role. As a research and 
education centre, like in the past, MIT keeps churning out highly educated engineers 
and highly motivated technology entrepreneurs (Roberts 1991). Its record is so 
strong that it remains to be a breeding ground and a kind of nursery case for Silicon 
Valley entrepreneurs (see figure 2). 
 
THE FAST FOLLOWER: STANFORD’S SILICON VALLEY IN THE SAN 
FRANCISCO/SAN JOSE AREA 
Silicon Valley was given its name by journalist Don Hoefler, who in 1971 wrote a 
number of articles about the semiconductor industry around Palo Alto in Electronic 
News. The origin of the industrial area is considered to be the creation of Hewlett-
Packard Company (HP) in 1939, which began in a small garage in Palo Alto, not far 
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from Stanford University. Silicon Valley now contains a heterogeneous network of 
larger and smaller technology companies, leading universities and research 
institutes, and an infrastructure of venture capitalists, specialised law firms, 
consultancies and other service providers (project developers, marketers, equipment 
leasers). This network was developed and matured especially in the fifties. The 
foundations go back to the 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th century with 
the creation and growth of Stanford University, the establishment and evolution of 
Silicon Valley’s first flagship firm ‘Federal Telegraph (FT)’ (with the help of 
Stanford University. 
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Figure 2: The genealogy of MIT 
 
The history of Stanford University goes back to 1891, when the former governor, 
senator and entrepreneur (president of the Central Pacific Railroad) Leland Stanford 
Sr., founded a university in the memory of his son, who had died at an early age: the 
Leland Stanford Junior University. The location for this private university was Palo 
Alto, where the family owned a farm and over 3,000 hectares of land. Students of 
this new university were expected not only to be motivated by a desire for 
knowledge, but also to apply that knowledge in every day (business) life. A former 
graduate from Stanford, Frederick Terman, later professor and dean of the 
Engineering School and Chairman of the University became the godfather of 
Stanford spin-offs and of all those ‘academic’ entrepreneurs who after graduation 
were to start their own companies; when Hewlett and Packard had just set up their 
company he gave them some money (see figure 2). Inspired by the dynamics of the 
East Coast, Terman wanted to create a technological community between local 
businesses and Stanford University. After taking a course in electrical engineering at 
Stanford in the early 1920s, Terman seemed to have wound up in the MIT-Harvard 
network on the East Coast. He took a PhD with the afore-mentioned Professor Bush 
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at MIT. However, during an attack of tuberculosis he decided to move back 
temporarily to sunny and pleasant California. He eventually decided to stay on the 
West Coast after he was appointed professor at the Engineering School and he was 
in a position to lead the new radio communication research laboratory at Stanford. 
Terman’s stay in California was interrupted during the Second World War, when he 
was director of Harvard’s Radio Research Laboratory. In Terman’s view (who had 
clearly been influenced by his teacher Vannevar Bush) Stanford University, like 
MIT on the East Coast, should be a centre for applied research and for close 
cooperation between a (technical) university, specialised contract research 
organisations, innovative companies and joint R&D centres: ’Such a community is 
composed of industries using highly sophisticated technologies, together with a 
strong university that is sensitive to the creative activities of the surrounding 
industry. This pattern appears to be the wave of the future (Terman quoted in 
Saxenian 1994: 22)’. In this context the Federal Government, to be more precise the 
Department of Defense, was also important: it needed supercomputers and later 
semiconductors, computer chips and network technologies.  
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Figure 3: the Stanford connection 
An important initiative in which Terman and a number of local entrepreneurs played 
a part was the creation, in 1946, of a special organisation within Stanford University 
to market technology and conduct contract research. In 1971, this Stanford Research 
Institute (SRI) became independent of Stanford University and was renamed SRI 
International. The research institute has a number of technological breakthroughs to 
its name, such as the inkjet printer, the modem and optical storage and scanning 
media. Terman was also closely involved in the commercial development of the 
large stretches of land that the Stanford heirs possessed. In his mind this provided an 
ideal opportunity for an R&D park close to the university. There were financial and 
strategic reasons for this. To have access to short-term funds and to be able to start 
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up new projects in the future, Stanford University decided to lease part of the 3,000 
hectare to the Stanford Shopping Center (which brought in $ 3 million a year). The 
creation of the Stanford Industrial Park in 1951, the first technology and science 
park in the world, in addition to having the above-mentioned financial reason, also 
had a strategic reason. Terman wanted to use the proceeds for a kind of ‘fighting 
fund’ to develop new activities on campus (Rogers & Larsen 1984: 35/36). The 
Industrial Park should become an attractive location for start-ups, specialised 
laboratories, offices and light production facilities of more established companies. In 
turn the university would not only have access to additional resources, it would also 
benefit from the investments and research plans of large and small technology 
companies. Lockheed, for example, moved its Missiles and Space Division to 
Sunnyvale and set up a special research laboratory, together with the university, on 
the Stanford Industrial Park. After welcoming its first tenants, Varian Associates, 
HP, Eastman Kodak and Lockheed, the technology park grew to 40 companies in 
1960. Another institutional innovation Terman implemented was the creation of an 
Office of Technology Licensing & Intellectual Property, founded in 1970, which 
focused on the commercialisation of the inventions of university researchers, patent 
applications and the stimulation of royalty revenues. 
 
Some FT employees started their own companies, just like Fairchild was to do 
almost 40 years later. In 1931, Jensen, Albertus and Pridham founded the audio-
speaker company Magnavox, a company that is still well-known today. Another 
former Stanford student and FT employee was Charles Litton, who in 1932 
established the still existing electronics company Litton Engineering Laboratories 
(after a wave of mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructuring, the company 
relocated to the Los Angeles area and re-established itself as a major defense 
contractor in 1953). In the 1930 and 1940s, Litton also became well-known as a 
stimulator of applied research and of innovations (by providing start-ups like 
Hewlett and Packard access to his laboratories) and as the animator of knowledge 
sharing and technology transfer for former Stanford students by organising seminars 
and discussions on applied research in his offices (Packard 1996). These seminars 
could be seen as the precursor of the sessions of the Homebrew Club, the computer 
enthusiasts club from the seventies. Another company in the Bay Area was the 
Ampex Corporation, which was founded in 1944 by Alex Poniatoff, the pioneer in 
the area of tape recording and radio antenna equipment. This company, became 
famous in the seventies when one of its employees, Nolan Bushnell, who was to 
become a pioneer in computer games, left the company to start a company called 
Atari.  
 
 The first generation of companies: from electrotechnical instruments to integrated 
circuits 
In 1937, William Hewlett and David Packard were encouraged by Terman to 
produce and market their design of an audio-oscillator (Packard 1996). HP’s first 
products, measuring and testing instruments, had been developed while Hewlett and 
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Packard were still students at Stanford’s Electrical Engineering Department. 
Although the idea to market their knowledge and products came from themselves, 
Terman arranged a part-time job at the faculty for one of them and helped the 
company secure a $ 750 loan from a Palo Alto bank (in addition to lending them an 
additional $ 538 himself). Although the company was not unsuccessful, it was only 
after the Second World War that it started to grow. Through military contracts for 
electronic measuring and testing equipment and receivers, the company’s turnover 
grew. HP is still one of the world’s leading electronics companies. Over time the 
company has expanded its technology portfolio from measuring and testing 
equipment to components, computer and network equipment, printing equipment 
and medical products and systems. In 1977, Hewlett and Packard paid back the 
money that Terman had given them in 1938, by donating $ 9.2 million to Stanford 
University for the construction of the Terman Engineering Center. In 1999, the 
company announced a split: its former core activity, the development and sale of 
measuring and testing equipment, was made independent (to which purpose a new 
company, Agilent Technologies, was created, and its current core activities 
(computers, network and printing equipment and medical technologies) remained 
part of the new HP.  
 
Despite having reached the respectable age of almost fifty and despite having 
expanded its scope, HP has tried to retain its innovative and entrepreneurial spirit 
through a participating and decentralised management style, known inside and 
outside the company as the HP Way (Packard 1996). This approach to work and 
management focuses on cooperation, effective project management and involvement 
from and by the entire organisation. Well-known elements of the HP Way are the 
use of team work, cross-functional integration, task forces and management-by-
objectives. Also, HP was among the first companies to experiment with ‘flextime’, 
‘open storeroom’ policy and workforce participation (via profit sharing and stock 
options. Over the years HP has always had a close connection with Stanford 
University. HP, for example, was one of the first tenants of the university’s new 
technology and science park, Stanford Industrial Park. Also, together they developed 
a special (post)doctoral evening course at Stanford University for HP engineers, the 
Honors Cooperative Program.  
 
Many high-tech companies at home and abroad have tried to emulate HP’s 
success.The company was an inspiration for many Silicon Valley start-ups (think of 
the garages in the Bay Area as nurseries for innovation and entrepreneurship). 
However, there is one major difference between the first generation of Silicon 
Valley and the subsequent generations. Companies like Intel, Apple, Sun, Cisco, 
Oracle, Netscape, Google, PayPal, YouTube have (in part) grown as a result of an 
active involvement of venture capitalists (e.g. Arthur Rock, Kleiner & Perkins, etc.), 
recognised business angels (Markula at Apple) and successful entrepreneurs (Clark 
at Netscape). HP financed its growth from its own resources. Instead of borrowing 
money from banks or giving shares to formal and informal investors, Packard and 
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Hewlett chose to expand on the basis of their own resources and profits (Packard 
1996).  
 
In addition to HP, there were other (smaller) electronics companies from Northern 
California that benefited from the defence contracts during the war. However, they 
did so at a modest scale, because the lion’s share of government investments stayed 
on the East Coast (Route 128/Boston). To change this state of affairs, 25 California-
based companies founded the Western Electronics Manufacturers Association 
(WEMA). Later, when WEMA had become successful, and a larger share of 
government investments went to the West Coast, WEMA was incorporated into the 
American Eletctronics Agency (AEA). Thus, in 1964, Silicon Valley and the Los 
Angeles and San Diego area were awarded 36.5% and 47.5% respectively of the 
Federal Department of Defense and NASA contracts (Hall 1998: 433). Important 
customers for the various generations of electronics companies from Silicon Valley 
were the Ames Research Center (the aviation and aerospace research centre of the 
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics and of NASA); Moffett Field Naval 
Air Station (later renamed Moffett Federal Base) (both located in Sunnyvale) and 
the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories (the research centre of the University of 
California). Attempting to increase cooperation between Stanford and the local 
industry was necessary to keep the gap in industrial development from increasing 
any further. The industrial activity around Stanford kept growing due to continuous 
military contracts. Thanks to the concentration of activity, knowledge and skills, and 
the friendly climate and natural beauty of the area, an increasing number of 
companies and research laboratories moved to the region. In the 1950s and 1960s, in 
the hay days of research labs, Lockheed, Westinghouse, Sylvania, Raytheon, ITT 
and IBM all set up research laboratories in the region.  
 
IBM opened its first research laboratory in Northern California in San José in 1952, 
which would be responsible for applied research into computer data storage. This 
signified a commitment of Big Blue to Silicon Valley and its locally trained 
engineers and scientists. Unlike Xerox’s research lab (see below), the IBM lab not 
only benefited the core enterprise, but also its former employees and spin-off 
companies. In the San José lab, for example, the random access memory system, the 
magnetic disk, the disk drive and the relational database technology were invented. 
These inventions have certainly not made IBM any poorer. Furthermore, IBM’s staff 
included entrepreneurial people like Gene Amdahl and Alan Shugart, who later all 
set up several ICT companies of their own. Gene Amdahl, for instance, the main 
architect of IBM’s 360 mainframe series, set up companies like Amdahl 
Corporation, Trilogy Systems and GRiD Systems Corporation. One of Amdahl’s 
employees, Lawrence Ellison, together with former Ampex colleagues, in 1977 set 
up Oracle Systems. Another former IBM employee who set out on his own was 
Shugart, who founded Shugart Associates and later Seagate (both companies are 
manufacturers of disk drives and storage technology for desktop computers).  
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In 1970, Xerox Corporation set up its Palo Alto Research Centre (PARC). While the 
company’s head office on the East Coast focused on the production of copying 
equipment, Xerox management wanted its West Coast branch to work on research 
and development of office automation. The list of experiments with new ICT 
applications and innovations that these scientists produced is impressive: personal 
computing, laser printer, easy-to-use word processing, desktop publishing, 
Ethernet/networking, open systems computing, graphical user interface, and 
bitmapping. However, Xerox never managed to reap the rewards of all these 
innovations. A number of the above-mentioned inventions was adopted and 
perfected by other companies (Apple with the computer mouse and icon-based 
computer operation, HP with the laser printer and SUN with open systems 
computing), or entrepreneurial researchers decided to set up their own companies to 
exploit the technologies they had developed (Adobe for desktop publishing and 
3Com for ethernet/networking applications) (see figure 3). Xerox was unable to 
integrate these innovations in their existing business models (Chesbrough, 2003). In 
2002 Xerox PARC was spun out as a separate company, although wholly owned by 
Xerox. 
Xerox PARC
Entrepreneurs / 
firms
Technologies / 
knowledge
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3Com (Metcalfe)
Laser printing
(HP)
Graphical User
Interface (Apple)
Neometron
(Goldberg)
Superpaint
(Lucas film, Pixar)
Aurora Systems
(Shoup)
Grid Systems
(Ellenby)
Komag 
(Chen)
Word processing
(Microsoft)
FileNet
(Miller)
Graphic chips &
VLSI (SGI)
Metaphor 
(Liddle)
Dynabook
Atari & LOGO
SmallTalk (Parc
Place & DigiTalk)
VLSI Technology
(Fairbarn)
Time-sharing
(DEC)
Open systems
Computing (SUN)
Figure 4: Xerox PARC’s offspring (1979-1982) 
 
The second generation of electronic companies: from computer chip to computer 
technology 
It was especially the semiconductor sector that experienced tremendous growth, to 
become the dominant industry from the early 1970s onwards. That was also the 
reason to dub the area Silicon Valley, after its main raw material. One of the 
forerunners of the semiconductors was the transistor, which was invented in 1947 by 
the physicists Bardeen, Brattain and Shockley on the American East Coast in the 
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Bell/Western Electric laboratories in Murray Hill (New Jersey), for which they 
received the Nobel Prize for Physics nine years later. It would have made sense for 
the companies located in the region, like RCA, Sylvania and Bell/Western Electric, 
to have taken the initiative for further innovation and commercial exploitation. 
However, it was the periphery that was able to take the credit: transistors, 
semiconductors and integrated switches reached their commercial maturity in 
Silicon Valley (with Shockley Laboratories, Fairchild, Intel and National 
Semiconductor as the main manufacturers), Phoenix, Arizona (where Motorola was 
located) and Dallas, Texas (home of Texas Instruments). What is striking about this 
is that, like the Route 128 companies, Texas Instruments and Motorola cause far 
lesser external dynamics than the continuous flow of spin-offs created by the much 
more dynamic Silicon Valley companies (Hall 1998: 435/451). Apparently, the 
techno-industrial region of Silicon Valley is unique in its dynamic innovations, 
active knowledge transfer and strategic network activities (Saxenian 1994; 1999).  
 
The choice of location of William Shockley and his research laboratory in what is 
now known as Silicon Valley was made more or less haphazardly. In the early 
fifties, Shockley had left AT&T’s Bell Laboratories to start his own company. He 
had considered Boston as the located of his own company, with the backing of one 
of the local champions of Route 128, Raytheon. However, when Raytheon displayed 
little interest, Shockley went back to California, where he was given the financial 
support he needed to set up his business (from Shockley’s former chemistry 
professor Beckman from the California Institute of Technology in Southern 
California). It started in 1955 with the foundation of the Shockley Semiconductor 
Laboratory in Mountain View, near Palo Alto. As one of the pioneers and experts in 
the field of transistor and semiconductor technology, it was easy for Shockley to 
appeal to highly qualified and ambitious researchers. He recruited a top team of 
young scientists and electronics specialists, and who to a certain extent were drawn 
by Shockley’s reputation as a scientist and by the pleasant Palo Alto environment. 
Most of Shockley’s people at some point became successful in the area of 
fundamental and applied research and/or high-tech entrepreneurship. Among 
Shockley’s early employees were people like Eugene Kleiner (then coming from 
General Electric, later founder/partner at venture capitalist Kleiner & Perkins), 
Gordon Moore (then Johns Hopkins University, later Intel), Robert Noyce (then 
Philco-Ford, later Intel) and Jean Hoerni (then California Institute of Technology, 
later Fairchild and Amelco, Union Carbide Electronics and Intersil). Although they 
were impressed by his electronics expertise, his detailed management style and 
aversion to working solely with silicon annoyed people to such an extent that eight 
of the top engineers left Shockley’s enterprise within two years after he had started.  
 
In 1957, the eight engineers, later known as The Traitorous Eight, set up the semi-
independent Fairchild Semiconductor with the help of the industrial sponsor 
Fairchild Camera & Instrumentation Corporation from New Jersey. Their leader was 
Robert Noyce, who in 1959, together with Jack Kilby of Texas Instruments, 
invented the integrated circuit. Since at that time there was hardly any venture 
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capital available outside Boston and New York, the inventors had to depend on the 
inventiveness of New York investment banker Hayden Stone, who suggested 
Fairchild (Hall 1998: 436). Fairchild invested in the new electronics company on 
condition that the parent company could take over the shares of the daughter 
company’s founders for three million dollars in case the new company were to make 
a profit within three years (Kenney & von Burg 1999: 81). Partly thanks to another 
invention, Hoerni’s invention of the planar process in 1960 (with allowed for mass 
production), and thanks to large contracts from IBM, the US Air Force and NASA, 
Fairchild soon became bigger than Shockley. In a short time its turnover grew to 
reach $ 130 million in 1963. Since Fairchild Semiconductor made a profit within 
three years, the founders-entrepreneurs had lost their claim to shares in ‘their’ 
company. This time it was the traitorous eight who felt betrayed.  
 
By 1968, all eight engineers had left Fairchild. Robert Noyce, Gordon Moore and 
Andy Grove became “world famous” when they founded Intel Corporation (the 
inventor of the microprocessor). Hoerni, Roberts and Kleiner founded Amelco 
(which later evolved into Teledyne Semiconductor), Charles Sporck moved to 
National Semiconductor and Jerry Sanders founded AMD. In the eighties, about half 
of all the semiconductor companies were direct or indirect descendants of Fairchild. 
In 1968, Noyce and Moore, together with Andy Grove, began to feel that working 
within the larger Fairchild setting (the core activity was cameras, semiconductors 
were merely a secondary activity) began to restrict their opportunities. Furthermore, 
there was a disagreement between Noyce and Moore on the one hand, and the 
Fairchild holding on the other, about stock options for engineers. Noyce and Moore 
saw stock option as a reward instrument for all employees, and not just for 
management (Rogers & Larsen 1984: 124; Cringely 1996: 39). In addition to 
serving as an extra reward, stock options were also suitable to attract and maintain 
highly trained and motivated personnel. The three founders-entrepreneurs of Intel 
had no trouble at all finding venture capital. The story goes that Arthur Rock 
managed to acquire $ 5 million by telephone within 30 minutes (Rogers & Larsen 
1984). The young company had the wind in its back right away when one of its 
researchers, Ted Hoff, invented the microprocessor in 1971.  
 
The strong reduction in military contracts in the early seventies was compensated in 
the semiconductor industry by a growing demand from the computer industry, 
which especially benefited the new companies like Intel, AMD and National 
Semiconductor. Unlike their descendants (‘the Fairchildren’), the two parent 
companies did not end up all that well (see figure 4). Shockley’s company was sold 
in 1960 and finally had to close its doors in 1968. Shockley himself worked as a part 
time professor at Stanford University later on. In 1979, Fairchild was bought by the 
French company Schlumberger, taken over by the Japanese company Fujitsu nine 
years later, and was finally ‘adopted’ by one of its spin-offs (National 
Semiconductor). In the eighties, the semiconductor manufacturers from Silicon 
Valley encounter fierce competition from Japanese companies as well as a 
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competing cluster at home, namely the Austin-San Antonio Corridor in Texas. The 
Japanese competition forced Intel, AMD and National Semiconductor to innovate: 
they needed to come up with computer chips that were even faster, better and 
cheaper. As a result of competition from the Far East, a number of collaborations 
emerged between the American semiconductor manufacturers, aimed at sharing te 
research costs and the development of new micro-electronics applications, such as 
the ASIC and RISC chips. These collaborations (i.e. Micro-electronics & Computer 
technology Corporation (MCC) and the Sematech consortium ) between micro-
electronic companies from Silicon Valley, Texas and Route 128 and the setting up 
of new branch offices in the South-East of the US, gradually caused the Bay Area to 
lose its exclusive right to manufacture semiconductors and computer chips.  
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 Figure 5: the Fairchild family 
However, Stanford University, together with local computer chip and 
microprocessor companies, had already developed another initiative by founding a 
new R&D centre in the field of Very Large Scale Integrated (VLSI) computer chips, 
the Center for Integrated Systems (CIS), founded in 1981. Initially, CIS/VLSI was 
funded by 18 industrial sponsors, who together provided $ 40.5 million, to which the 
Department of Defense added another $ 8 million for additional research contracts. 
Stanford University committed to the project by taking on the management of CIS 
and by training highly qualified electro-technical engineers (100 Master students and 
30 PhD’s), who would be the first available staff for the sponsors.  
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At that time, flexible production networks had developed in Silicon Valley between 
the established companies, like National Semiconductor and AMD, who focused on 
the mass production of chips, and newcomers who specialised in custom-made 
products or parts of computer chip manufacturing. This meant that, in parallel with 
the growth of the semiconductor industry, there were suppliers of capital goods and 
materials needed to design and manufacture semiconductors. This infrastructure 
simplified and stimulated the emergence of specialised start-ups. In the same period 
the financing of start-ups by venture capitalists increased. Many successful 
entrepreneurs decided to reinvest their profits in start-ups and to give them advice, 
not least to minimise the risks. Castells and Hall (1994: 19) point out that venture 
capital, which was abundantly available in Silicon Valley, there are more than 200 
venture capital companies active in Silicon Valley (Aoki & Takizawa, 2002) from 
the 1970s onwards, did not come from the financial sector but from the industry 
itself. The availability of venture capital depended not only on the performance of 
the individual companies and the local industry as a whole, but also to a large extent 
on the government’s fiscal policy (Rogers & Larsen 1984). In 1969, there was $ 171 
million in venture capital, which dropped to $ 39 million in 1977 (capital gains tax 
had increased from 29% to 49%), after which it rose to $ 570 million (capital gains 
tax reduced to 28%), and reached a ceiling of $ 1.3 billion in 1981 (tax further 
reduced to 20%). It is precisely in that period that now well-known venture 
capitalists like Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield & Byers (who invested in SUN, Netscape, 
America Online, Amazon.com, Excite, and Google), Sequioa (Oracle, Cisco, 
Yahoo! and also Google) and Mayfield (3Com, Silicon Graphics and Genentech) 
and the law firms specialising in high-tech entrepreneurship like Sonsini and 
Fenwick reached maturity.  
 
The third generation of companies: from PC’s and databases to the Internet 
The dominant industrial system in Silicon Valley is network-based. Instead of the 
traditional integrated management whereby the entire production process is carried 
out in-house, a structure has developed of mutually dependent, highly specialised 
companies. The open, informal and pioneering culture contributed a great deal to 
this. There is a lot of freedom to experiment, and risk-taking is considered a virtue 
rather than a sin, and the associated risk of failure is accepted. The emergence of 
Silicon Valley occurred at the same time as the civilian breakthrough of the 
semiconductor industry. The industry’s pioneers were young and technology-
oriented, had a common background (Stanford or MIT) and many of them had 
worked at Fairchild (the Fairchildren) and had received a famous training 
(“Fairchild University”). The collective identity has stimulated network formation 
and informal communication. Often, these ties appeared stronger than belonging to a 
certain company; as Saxenian (1994: 30) puts it: “They created firms that were 
organized as loosely linked confederations of engineering teams”. Due to the many 
opportunities in the region, people move about quite a bit. Although people are 
asked to sign non-disclosure contracts, a great deal of knowledge and skills are 
exported implicitly, which provided a strong stimulus to the diffusion of knowledge 
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in the region. Some people knew each other from Stanford and, or Xerox Palo Alto 
Research Center, both talent nurseries. Examples of this are the founders of 
companies like Apple, SUN, Cisco, Silicon Graphics, Netscape, Excite, Yahoo! and 
Google.  
 
Apple was founded by Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak, two university drop-outs and 
ardent computer hobbyists. Like so many in their generation, they were active in the 
Homebrew Computer Club, founded in 1975 by a close-knit and fanatical group of 
enthusiasts in and around Menlo Park. The first meetings took place in the garage of 
one of the founders, later meetings took place in the Stanford auditorium. Like their 
illustrious local predecessors Hewlett and Packard, Jobs and Wozniak decided to set 
up their own company, working from a garage (in this case that of Jobs’ parents in 
Los Gatos). Another source of inspiration was the first commercial supplier of 
personal computers (or rather minicomputer kits), the Altair of a company called 
MITS from Albuquerque (New Mexico). Jobs and Wozniak both had working and 
programming experience: Jobs worked at computer game pioneer Atari (founded by 
Nolan Bushnell), and Wozniak at Hewlett-Packard. The concrete idea for a modern 
computer that would be more than a collection of print cards (like the first computer, 
the Altair from 1975) arose when Jobs and Wozniak want to sell their first design 
for the Apple I (in the form of a computer kit) in the first specialised computer store 
in the world: The Byte Shop in Mountain View (Rogers & Larsen 1984: 10).  
 
After their respective employers turned down their idea (but did not object to them 
developing it themselves) Jobs and Wozniak decided to develop their first computer, 
the Apple II, using ‘some’ electronics components from Atari and HP. In 1976, they 
founded the Apple computer company, together with Intel veteran Mike Markkula. 
Markkula, Intel’s former senior marketing manager, helped the inexperienced 
entrepreneurs write a business plan and acquire financial resources ($ 91,000 of their 
own money for a third of the company, a $ 250,000 credit from the Bank of America 
and $ 600,000 from venture capitalists). Furthermore, Markkula suggested bringing 
Mike Scott, an experienced National Semiconductor manager, on board as president 
of Apple. At the end of the seventies, Jobs and Wozniak were to adopt and perfect 
the mouse interface, icon and pull down menus they ‘happened’ to see at a tour of 
Xerox’s PARC lab. In 1979, Jobs was given a tour by Larry Tesler (a member of the 
Homebrew Computer Club), with all the consequences for the development of the 
PC. As far as Jobs was concerned, a visit to PARC, like the Xerox Alto computer, 
was ‘information at one’s fingertips’. Later, Tesler was also hired by Apple to 
further develop the new graphical interfaces. From the start, Apple was an 
innovative, creative and somewhat chaotic company, which in addition was ‘lean’, 
in the sense that specialised companies were used to manufacture parts and 
components.  
 
Jobs and Wozniak decided to leave the garage for the new generation of computers, 
the Apple II, and to move to a building in Cupertino. After that, things went fast, 
within four years the company was listed at the stock exchange, and founders Jobs 
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and Wozniak, and with them Scott, became multimillionaires overnight (the fourth 
man Markkula already was). Next to the 40% of the company that was owned by the 
founders-entrepreneurs, 60% was in the hands of venture capitalists: they had no 
reason to complain either, with a return of $ 243 for every dollar they had invested 
(Rogers & Larsen 1984: 18).Over the years Apple generated few spin-offs: the best-
know are Radius, Be Labs, General Magic and Claris. On the other hand, Apple 
employees, especially when the company went through a rough period in the early 
1990s, did switch to other companies, among which Netscape was the favourite. 
Apple succeeded to recreate itself by introducing iPod, and the iTunes store. Apple's 
renewed success became evident in its increasing stock market value during the 
period 2003-2005. 
 
A company that flourished in Apple’s wake was Adobe. This company was founded 
in 1982 by John Warnock, who developed algorithms for three-dimensional 
representations at the University of Utah, and who, together with fellow founder 
Charles Geschke had continued to work on the subject at Xerox PARC. Although 
Xerox was not interested in the technology, it was the basis for later products in the 
area of desktop publishing, design and graphics industry software, and of the 
PostScript language, which made it possible to print PDF files. Although relatively 
unknown, Adobe, after several strategic acquisitions, is one of the largest computer 
companies in the United States. For a long time, its strong link with the Apple 
hardware was its biggest problem. Thanks to alliances with Microsoft and Sun, this 
lock-in relationship was broken. 
 
Another company that was founded in 1982 is Silicon Graphics Inc (SGI), by 
Stanford professor (computer sciences) Jim Clark and Marc Hannah, a student. The 
reason for setting up the company was a sponsored research project for the design of 
a computer chip with a gigantic capacity that would be suitable for animation 
applications (the ‘geometry engine’). Silicon Graphics has become an important 
player in the area of ‘mips’ (= millions of instructions per second) microprocessors 
(due in part through the acquisition of MIPS Technologies Systems), super-
computing (especially after it took over Cray) and specialises in animation and 3D 
technology. The company focused on visualisation technologies, and as such it had 
close links with Hollywood (for instance, SGI made an important contribution to 
films like Forrest Gump and Jurassic Park). SGI encountered increasing competition 
from HP and Compaq Computers. SGI became a company in search of a new 
strategy, and in 2006 filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, as part of a plan to 
reduce its debt. In October 2006 it was announced that SGI has emerged from 
Chapter 11 protection. 
 
Oracle was founded around the same time as Apple and Silicon Graphics, and at the 
turn of the century is one of the biggest database companies. Its founder Lawrence 
Ellison combined the concept of relational databases with SQL, which were both 
developed by IBM, and thus made it possible to extract any kind of date from 
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company databases. In 1979, Oracle developed the first SQL-based Relational 
Database Management System (RDBMS), which meant that it managed to market 
this product before IBM did. Oracle’s database technology is so fundamental and 
sturdy that the company’s position is very strong. Oracle is developing into a full 
service software and consultancy company. In 2004 Oracle acquired its competitor 
Peoplesoft in a hostile take-over. 
 
An important player, especially with regard to impulses towards the Internet, is 
SUN. SUN originally is an acronym for Stanford University Network, which is an 
indication as to where its roots lie. SUN is a powerful workstation that was 
developed in 1981 by Andreas Bechtolsheim, who was frustrated that he had to go 
the computer centre every time he needed a powerful system. His previous 
experience at Xerox PARC, where he saw the concept of simple desktop computers 
connected to a network, and his knowledge of computer technology, allowed him to 
build his first computer on the basis of standard components. SUN is an open system 
that uses UNIX. Sales went so well that Khosla (a Stanford MBA graduate who had 
started his own company before, and also later in his career became partner of 
Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield & Byers), in 1982 convinced Bechtolsheim to start a 
company together. Scott McNeally, a Harvard economist (and Stanford MBA) and 
Bill Joy, a UNIX expert from the University of Berkeley, were also involved in the 
creation of SUN Microsystems. The UNIX operating system has always been an 
important business driver for SUN, as becomes clear by alliances with, among 
others, AT&T for the development of the business standard for UNIX and for the 
development of UNIX servers. Further alliances with Oracle and other database 
suppliers like Informix and Sybase have allowed to expand its position as market 
leader further.  
 
In addition to SUN, Cisco played a major role in the breakthrough of Internet 
technology. Like SUN, Cisco originated at Stanford and like SUN it was set up in 
the early eighties. Leonard Bosack and Sandy Lerner, a married couple working as 
network managers for different faculties, were looking for a solution, other than the 
connection via mainframes, that would make it possible, to connect networks. 
Together with students they developed the router, a device that made it possible to 
connect network at a fraction of the then current costs. In 1984, they started Cisco 
Systems Inc. from their home. It has been said that the start-up mentality has been 
crucial to Cisco’s success (Cohan 1999: 30). Cisco is highly customer-oriented, 
places great value on cooperating with its customers (don’t just become a Cisco 
client, become a Cisco partner), and leads the way when it comes to e-commerce 
applications and the support of all kinds of customer self-services processes with 
Internet technology. Cisco works hard on maintaining its technological lead. On the 
one hand, it does so through acquisitions aimed at gathering core competences, and 
on the other hand by attracting competent employees. An example of such a 
takeover is Granite Systems, just another company that was founded by 
Bechtolsheim. Bechtolsheim was involved earlier in setting up SUN, and after he 
had left SUN with $ 50 million in shares had started a new company to develop a 
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fast computer chip with which Gigabit Ethernet could be run. Cisco controls the 
market for Internet network hardware, with a market share of 85%. Cisco’s strategy, 
under John Chambers (former Wang director) is to become the third major high-tech 
monopolist next to Intel and Microsoft, although that means the company has to deal 
with parties operating in the traditional network sector, like Lucent and Nortel.  
 
The companies that have been discussed thus far, like Hewlett Packard, Apple, 
Silicon Graphics, SUN and Cisco, are among the companies that have produced 
enabling technologies for the Internet, i.e. relevant hardware and software, and are 
continuing to do so. However, these were the companies that really felt the 
downturn after the deflating of the Internet bubble, but succeeded to survive. The 
dramatic decline of market capitalization, substantial losses and declining revenues 
led to exit of executives, layoffs, and expense-reduction efforts. Sun started to make 
profits again in 2005. Silicon Graphics almost went bankrupt, Apple survived only 
due to the iPod. A large number of the next generation companies in Silicon Valley 
however did not survive when the Internet bubble burst. 
 
The fourth generation of companies: the Internet intermediaries 
The next generation of companies focuses more on easy access to the Internet, 
searching the web and on push-media. A pioneering company in the web browsing 
market is Netscape, co-founded by Stanford professor and founder of SGI Jim 
Clark. Excite and Yahoo! focused on searching the web. Excite was founded in 1994 
by Stanford students Graham Spencer and Joe Kraus, Mark Van Haren, Ryan 
McIntyre, Ben Lutch and Martin Reinfried, with financial support from Kleiner & 
Perkins partner Khosla. Yahoo! was founded in 1995 by Jerry Yang and David Flo, 
also Stanford PhD students. Yahoo! eventually moved from a search engine to a 
portal. Although many of these companies provided a strong impulse to the 
development of the Internet, they hardly have a lasting competitive edge as became 
apparent during the dotcom crisis. This can be explained to some extent by the low 
entry barriers for companies wanting to set up similar activities, the fact that in the 
information economy many ideas are easily copied, and the relatively short time 
they had to try and establish a market leadership (Shapiro & Varian 1999; Cohan 
1999). For instance, due to fierce competition from Microsoft and IBM, Netscape’s 
business model did not prove strong either, and in 1998 the company had to accept a 
$ 4.2 billion offer from America Online (AOL), and Excite, in 1999 taken over by 
At Home for $ 6.7 billion, went bankrupt in 2001. The dominant development 
model for Internet companies that arose in the early nineties seems to lead from 
Internet intermediaries like search engines and portals to content providers and 
media companies. This trend is most probably the exponent of the convergence of 
the Internet and the East Coast based content industry.  
 
Google is the most illustrative example of an Internet intermediary moving in the 
direction of offering content. As with many other companies in Silicon Valley the 
two founders of Google Larry Page and Sergey Brin are two former PhDs in the 
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computer sciences at Stanford University who decided to give priority to their 
venturing activities. They started Google traditionally in a garage in Menlo Park, 
with initial financial support from Andy Bechtolsheim, and later from both Kleiner 
& Perkins and Sequoia. Google entered the Internet domain rather late in 1999. 
Google offers a search service based on advanced algorithms, able to analyze back 
links from web pages, and distributed computing. In 2001 Google already made 
profit, with almost no marketing effort, but a well-planned PR-campaign towards the 
media. Google’s IPO was in 2004. Google initially made money by selling their 
search technology to customers, who can use it on their own sites, and by a keyword 
advertising programme. In 2002 Google introduced a cost-per-click pricing model. 
Google generated 98% of its sales from text ads, placed around search results. After 
their IPO, Google introduced a wide range of new services, expanding their original 
strength the Internet search; among the new products and services are Gmail, 
Google Desktop, Google Maps, Google Book Search, Google Talk, Froogle (online 
shopping engine), and Google Earth. The recent acquisition of the start-up firm 
YouTube by Google has not only allowed for an integration of YouTube’s and 
Google’s video sharing facilities, but when combined with its s search engine and 
electronic marketing capabilities, Google was able to capture a new wave of 
customers and users groups from all over the world in this newly emerging ‘personal 
video’ market. 
 
In 2005 Google took a minority share of 5% in Time Warner’s AOL. Google's 
success did lead to the question if Google was not becoming too powerful to stay a 
partner of AOL. As a consequence of Google’s strategic partnerships deals with Dell 
and Sun and through the offerings of its distinctive stand-alone applications and 
desktop extensions (e.g. Gmail, Picasa, Pack, Talk, Toolbar, Blogger Web), Google 
is effectively penetrating the software market and is becoming a serious threat to 
Microsoft. Google is also entering the mobile (software) market, developing a 
software platform for mobiles, and experimenting with online payments, i.e. Google 
Wallet, basically by teaming up with wireless and mobile start-ups. eBay, owner of 
the competing PayPal payment platform, and Amazon are concerned with Google’s 
huge user base, and their push into eCommerce. The question remains open how 
Google is going to affect the media, and technology business landscape. But it will 
be evident that Silicon Valley will be its playing ground. Silicon Valley will be more 
integrated with the content industry. Not only the convergence of Internet with the 
media industry will be discussed in the near future of Silicon Valley, also the 
expected convergence of biotechnology with information and nanotechnology will 
be shaping Silicon Valley’s future. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
An important element in the development of high-tech regions has to do with 
knowledge transfer in its various forms. This does not just refer to the role of 
knowledge infrastructure and the various ways in which knowledge is distributed 
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(through talent acquisition and recruitment, and licensing as with MIT and 
Stanford), via the role of science and technology parks en incubation centres, but 
also to the role of central knowledge enterprises that transfer and use developments. 
In this respect it is striking that especially in Silicon Valley, there is a much higher 
degree of openness and willingness to exchange information and share knowledge 
with the network of relevant contacts, suppliers and customers. Although various 
knowledge transfer mechanisms are in place in Route 128 as well, generally 
speaking there is a tendency to keep information and knowledge much more within 
the own organisation. In addition, labour mobility in Route 128 is much lower than 
it is in Silicon Valley. Undoubtedly the organisational structure of large dominant 
enterprises, the vertically integrated (mini)computer manufacturers like DEC, Data 
General and Prime, as well as the need for secrecy associated with some defence 
contracts, has played a role in that respect. Against the vertically integrated 
production system of Route 128, Silicon Valley has its horizontal networks 
consisting of a number of core companies with a flat organisational structure and 
relatively small-scale suppliers. Furthermore dynamics are high, with a high labour 
mobility and a large number of spin-offs and start-ups. 
 
Also, the role of technology customer is important. In Route 128 it is especially the 
military industrial complex, and with it the Federal Government (Pentagon, NASA, 
DARPA) that has played a major role. The spin-offs using military technology for 
civilian purposes have not been insignificant (e.g. Raytheon, DEC, Data General). 
The same is true in the case of Silicon Valley. However, in the case of Silicon 
Valley civilian applications started playing an increasingly important role from the 
1970s onward, and have developed into a driving force of their own. Especially the 
semiconductor, PC technology, and the network technologies that have led to the 
new wave of Internet-related innovation, are rooted in Silicon Valley. The 
increasing acceptance and economic use of Internet technologies has also led to a 
different kind of customers and the emergence of clusters close to the customer, for 
instance the media and entertainment industry. Silicon Valley illustrates the shift 
towards the advertising and media sector and the possible convergence of content, 
hardware and software..  
 
Capital has become and increasingly important lubricant. Together with the shift 
from a focus on military technologies and products towards civilian applications, 
funding has shifted from the (Federal) Government towards the private sector, 
especially venture capital with banks playing a limited role. With the success of the 
region, the role and size of venture capital increases. Successful entrepreneurs are 
prepared to reinvest the capital they have earned in new technologies and business 
concepts, and make as such a substantial contribution to serial entrepreneurship and 
informal investing. Venture capitalists hitch a ride on the success of successful 
enterprises and their capitalisation via an IPO. Because they benefit financially from 
the success of the companies in which they have invested, the capital at their 
disposal increases further, allowing them to reinvest it again, causing a kind of 
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flywheel effect. Especially in Silicon Valley this has led to a unique kind of 
dynamics. In the 1960s, Noyce and the other traitors of Shockley’s Semiconductor 
were forced to look for funds on the East Coast before being able to set up Fairchild 
Semiconductor on the West Coast. After they made their company into a success 
and realised the industry’s potential, they decided to leave Fairchild and set up their 
own company. These traitorous eight (and the companies they have started) are now 
among the most important local investors in the region as business angels (e.g. 
Gordon Moore), as venture capitalists (Eugene Kleiner) or through a business 
investment fund (Intel’s corporate venture fund). 
 
Except investors, venture capitalists are also network brokers, they provide the 
missing links in the management of new companies. By establishing new contacts 
with customers, distributors and new management they provide new and vulnerable 
companies with a broader techno-economic foundation and a higher degree of social 
legitimacy. Together, the wheeling and dealing of venture capitalists, the continuous 
creation of spin-offs and the high level of workforce mobility create a rich network. 
Rich in a financial sense but also with regard to the variety of contacts and sources 
of information. In addition, ICT clusters have developed networks, platform, and 
communities for collective knowledge creation, information sharing and interest 
representation. In short, an effective high-tech cluster requires more than just money 
and business experience, it also requires knowledge and – perhaps more importantly 
– networks. Apart from the driving forces, such as the presence of talent and wealthy 
customers, the role of venture capital, and the availability of knowledge and 
contacts, a specific culture and innovative entrepreneurship (the possibility to fail, 
the development of creativity, the utilisation of opportunities and coincidences), and 
the quest for (financial) success play an important role in all areas. That it is Silicon 
Valley that has as yet the greatest potential is obvious. This confirmation of success 
breeds its own success can be found in the fact that the region keeps reinventing 
itself and in the effective transition towards working on and with new 
groundbreaking technologies. 
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